That a British army of nearly six thousand fighting men--occupying a
position chosen and fortified by our own officers, and having
possession, within two miles of this fortified cantonment, of a strong
citadel commanding the greater part of the town of Cabul, a small
portion only of whose population rose against us at the commencement of
the revolt--should not only have made no vigorous effort to crush the
insurrection; but that it should ultimately have been driven by an
undisciplined Asiatic mob, destitute of artillery, and which never
appears to have collected in one place above 10,000 men, to seek safety
in a humiliating capitulation, by which it surrendered the greater part
of its artillery, military stores, and treasure, and undertook to
evacuate the whole country on condition of receiving a safe conduct from
the rebel chiefs, on whose faith they placed, and could place, no
reliance; and finally, that, of about 4500 armed soldiers and twelve
thousand camp-followers, many of whom were also armed, who set out from
Cabul, only one man, and he wounded, should have arrived at Jellalabad;
is an amount of misfortune so far exceeding every rational anticipation
of evil, that we should have been entitled to assume that these
unparalleled military disasters arose from a series of unparalleled
errors, even if we had not had, as we now have, the authority of Lord
Ellenborough for asserting the fact.
But every nation, and more particularly the British nation, is little
inclined to pardon the men under whose command any portion of its army
or of its navy may have been beaten. Great Britain, reposing entire
confidence in the courage of her men, and little accustomed to see them
overthrown, is keenly jealous of the reputation of her forces; and, as
she is ever prompt to reward military excellence and success, she heaps
unmeasured obloquy on those who may have subjected her to the
degradation of defeat. When our forces have encountered a reverse, or
even when the success has not been commensurate with the hopes that had
been indulged; the public mind has ever been prone to condemn the
commanders; and wherever there has been reason to believe that errors
have been committed which have led to disaster, there has been little
disposition to make any allowances for the circumstances of the case, or
for the fallibility of man; but, on the contrary, the nation has too
often evinced a fierce desire to punish the leaders for the
mortification the country has been made to endure.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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