"There is doubtless," he says, in his _Avertissement_, "a close resemblance between my _Philosophie Positive_, and what the English, especially since the days of Newton, understand by _Natural Philosophy_. But I would not adopt this last expression, any more than that of _Philosophy of the Sciences_, which would have perhaps been still more precise, because neither of these has yet been extended to all orders of phenomena, whilst _Philosophie Positive_, in which I comprehend the study of the social phenomena, as well as all others, designs a uniform manner of reasoning applicable to all subjects on which the human mind can be exerted. Besides which, the expression _Natural Philosophy_ is employed in England to denote the aggregate of the several sciences of observation, considered even in their most minute details; whereas, by the title of _Philosophie Positive_, I intimate, with regard to the several positive sciences, a study of them only in their generalities, conceiving them as submitted to a uniform method, and forming the different parts of a general plan of research. The term which I have been led to construct is, therefore, at once more extended and more restricted than other denominations, which are so far similar that they have reference to the same fundamental class of ideas." This very announcement of M. Comte's intention to comprehend in his course of natural philosophy the study of the several phenomena, compels us to enquire how far these are fit subjects for the strict application of the scientific method. We waive the metaphysical question of the free agency of man, and the theological question of the occasional interference of the Divine Power; and presuming these to be decided in a manner favourable to the project of our Sociologist, we still ask if it be possible to make of the affairs of society--legislation and politics, for instance--a department of science?