Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 62, No. 382, August 1847Various
History
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 62, No. 382, August 1847
Various
England -- Periodicals; Scotland -- Periodicals
Psychology, or the science of the human mind, teaches a very different
doctrine. According to this science, the perception of matter is a
secondary and composite truth. It admits of being analysed into a
subjective and an objective element--a mental modification called
perception on the one hand, and matter _per se_ on the other. It is an
effect induced by real objects. It is not the first _datum_ of
intelligence. It has matter itself for its antecedent. Such, in very
general terms, is the explanation of the perception of matter which
psychology proposes.
Psychology and metaphysics are thus radically opposed to each other in
their solutions of the highest problem of speculation. Stated concisely,
the difference between them is this:--psychology regards the perception
of matter as susceptible of analytic treatment, and travels, or
endeavours to travel, beyond the given fact: metaphysic stops short in
the given fact, and there makes a stand, declaring it to be all
indissoluble unity. Psychology holds her analysis to be an analysis of
things. Metaphysic holds the psychological analysis to be an analysis
of sounds--and nothing more.
These observations exhibit, in their loftiest generalisation, the two
counter doctrines on the subject of perception. We now propose to follow
them into their details, for the purpose both of eliciting the truth and
of arriving at a correct judgment in regard to the reformation which Dr
Reid is supposed to have effected in this department of philosophy.
The psychological or analytic doctrine is the first which we shall
discuss, on account of its connexion with the investigations of Dr
Reid,--in regard to whom we may state, beforehand, our conclusion and
its grounds, which are these:--that Reid broke down in his philosophy,
both polemical and positive, because he assumed the psychological and
not the metaphysical doctrine of perception as the basis of his
arguments. He did not regard the perception of matter as absolutely
primary and simple; but in common with all psychologists, he conceived
that it admitted of being resolved into a mental condition, and a
material reality; and the consequence was, that he fell into the very
errors which it was the professed business of his life to denounce and
exterminate. How this catastrophe came about we shall endeavour shortly
to explain.
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