purified, and consequently the belief itself cannot be entertained. People have, then, _no belief_ in the independent existence of matter--that is, in the existence of matter entirely denuded of perception. This point being proved, what becomes of Dr Reid's appeal to _this belief_ in support of matter's independent existence? It has not only no force; it has no meaning. This second tactic is invincible. Scepticism and idealism are perfectly in the right when they refuse to accept as the guarantee of independent matter a belief which itself has no manner of existence. How can they be vanquished by an appeal to a nonentity? A question may here be raised. If the belief in question be not the fact, what has hitherto prevented scepticism from putting a final extinguisher on Reid's appeal by _proving_ that no such belief exists? A very sufficient reason has prevented scepticism, from doing this--from explicitly extinguishing the appeal. There is a division of labour in speculation as well as in other pursuits. It is the sceptic's business simply to deny the existence of the belief: it is no part of his business to exhibit the grounds of his denial. _We_ have explained these grounds; but were the sceptic to do this, he would be travelling out of his vocation. Observe how the case stands. The reason why matter _per se_ is not and cannot be believed in, is because it is impossible for thought to disengage matter from perception, and consequently it is impossible for thought to believe in the disengaged existence of matter. The matter to be, believed in is not disengaged from the perception, consequently it cannot be believed to be disengaged from the perception. But unless it be believed to be disengaged from the perception, it cannot be believed to exist _per se_. In short, as we have already said, the impossibility of complying with the _condition_ of the belief is the ground on which the sceptic denies the _existence_ of the belief. But the sceptic is himself debarred from producing these grounds. Why? Because their exhibition would be tantamount to a rejection of the principle which he has _accepted_ at the hands of the orthodox and dogmatic psychologist. That principle is the analysis so often spoken of--the separation, namely, of the perception of matter into perception and matter _per se_. The sceptic accepts this analysis. His business is simply to _accept_, not to discover or scrutinise principles. Having accepted the analysis, he then denies that any belief attaches to the existence of matter _per se_. In this he is quite right. But he cannot, consistently with his calling, exhibit the ground of his denial; for this ground is, as we have shown, the impossibility of performing the analysis,--of effecting the requisite disengagement. But the sceptic has accepted the analysis, has admitted the disengagement. He therefore cannot now retract: and he has no wish to retract. His special