Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 62, No. 382, August 1847Various
History
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 62, No. 382, August 1847
Various
England -- Periodicals; Scotland -- Periodicals
From having never properly secreted scepticism and idealism in his own
mind, Reid fell into the commission of one of the gravest errors of
which a philosopher can be guilty. He falsified the fact in regard to
our primitive beliefs--a thing which the obnoxious systems against which
he was fighting never did. He conceived that scepticism and idealism
called in question a fact which was countenanced by a natural belief;
accordingly, he confronted their denial with the allegation that the
disputed fact--the existence of matter _per se_--was guaranteed by a
primitive conviction of our nature. But this fact receives no support
from any such source. There is no belief in the whole repository of the
mind which can be fitted on to the existence of matter denuded of all
perception. Therefore, in maintaining the contrary, Reid falsified the
fact in regard to our primitive convictions--in regard to those
principles of common sense which he professed to follow as his guide.
This was a serious slip. The rash step which he here took plunged him
into a much deeper error than that of the sceptic or idealist. They
err[24] in common with him in accepting as their starting-point the
analysis of the perception of matter. He errs, by himself, in
maintaining that there is a belief where no belief exists.
But do not scepticism and idealism doubt matter's existence
_altogether_, or deny to it _any_ kind of existence? Certainly they do;
and in harmony with the principle from which they start they must do
this. The _only_ kind of matter which the analysis of the perception of
matter yields, is matter _per se_. The existence of such matter is, as
we have shown, altogether uncountenanced either by consciousness or
belief. But there is no other kind of matter in the field. We must
therefore either believe in the existence of matter _per se_, or we must
believe in the existence of _no_ matter whatever. We do not, and we
cannot believe in the existence of matter _per se_; therefore, we cannot
believe in the existence of matter at all. This is not satisfactory, but
it is closely consequential.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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