On those _data_, the question of _national_ fleets is easily decided. England is not only the first naval power in the world, but she must _continue_ the first; because a fleet is _necessary_ to her existence, which _it is not_ to that of any other European throne. This is the dictate of nature, and is therefore a _law_. Other powers may possess a fleet as an appendage to their national strength, as suitable to their rank, or as adding to their means of hostilities. Still, to them, a fleet is not a _necessity_. Russia, France, and Spain have no more _necessity_ for a fleet, than Prussia, Austria, and Switzerland! But England, without a fleet, would be exposed to invasion on every point of a coast extending two thousand miles. Her wealth is all loose upon the ocean; her chief territories are all beyond the ocean: thus, _without_ a fleet, she would be almost wholly without the means of external defence, of retaliation for injuries, and of the commerce which is the most essential basis of her revenue. The result is, that, while the Continental kingdoms might be powerful states, yet not possess a ship on the seas, England, stript of her naval superiority, would instantly sink from her high position, would lose the larger portion of her power, would be separated from her most important colonies, would see her revenues decay,--and, if assailed by a foreign enemy, would see her resources suddenly stopped, and must prepare for the last extremities of struggle, hand to hand. In this view, we do not confine the question to the national fondness for the sea--to that mixture of boldness and skill which predominates in the character of our sailors, and forms the especial qualification of a sea-faring people,--nor to national superiority of any kind; but to the simple fact, that the possession of predominant power on the ocean _cannot_ be dispensed with by England, while it _can_ be dispensed with by every other power of the globe.