Must it not be asked, Why did the French suffer him to exhibit this _firmness_? why did they not beat him at once? Do generals win battles merely by waiting, until their antagonists are tired of crushing them? But the Frenchman still has a resource--he accounts for it all by the design of a higher power! "It was _thus_, nevertheless, that the designs of Providence were to be accomplished. It gave to the general, destined to meet _incontestably superior_ troops(!!), whose _first_ efforts were _irresistible_, that _systematic_ and _temporising_ character, which was to _wear out_ the ardour of our soldiers." Having thus accounted for the French perpetuity of defeat on land, by a man of stupidity and stone; he accounts, with equal satisfaction, for the perpetuity of defeat at sea by a man of activity and animation. "To the admiral who was to meet squadrons fresh out of harbour, and easily disconcerted by a sudden attack, Providence gave that fiery courage and audacity which alone could bring about those great disasters, that would _not_ have been inflicted under the rules of the old school of tactics." The Frenchman, in his eagerness to disparage Wellington as dull, and Nelson as rash, forgets that he forces his reader to the conclusion, that tardiness and precipitancy are equally fit to beat the French. Or if they are _incontestably_ superior troops, and their first onset is _irresistible_, how is it that they are beaten at the last, or are ever beaten at all? We also find the curious and rather unexpected acknowledgment, that Providence was always against them, and that it had determined on their _defeat_, whether their enemy were swift or slow. We are afraid that we have been premature in giving M. de la Gravière credit for getting rid of his prejudices. But we shall set him a better example. We shall not deny that the French make excellent soldiers; that they have even a sort of national fitness for soldiership; that they form active, bold, and highly effective troops: though, for them, as sailors, we certainly cannot say as much. Henry IV. remarked "that he never knew a French king lucky at sea;" and Henry spoke the truth. And the wisest thing which France could do, would be to give up all attempts to be a "naval power,"--which she never has been, and never can be--and expend her money and her time on the comforts, the condition, and the spirit of her people, both citizens and soldiery.