The question as to the real nature of a pound is useless at the present time. We are not now discussing the older banking acts, but the wretched abortion of 1844, which has led to this unnatural crisis. It is, in fact, a question which ought not to be mixed up with the others, because if, as Sir Robert Peel maintains, a pound is neither more nor less than a piece of metal of a certain weight and fineness, to which he, in opposition to the practice and experience of the whole world beside, has attempted to give a fixed unvarying price. He should in the first instance be prepared to defend it as the sole basis for every kind of representative circulation. In short, if his theory be correct, no banker should be permitted to issue a note, unless he has within his coffers a “pound,”--that is, a sovereign, to redeem it. Were the bullionists consistent, such indeed would be the proper result of their arguments, and the consequence would be, that at the present moment the legal circulation of England would have been something under ten millions. We shall not pause to demonstrate the absurdity of such a position, because it carries distinctly upon its face its own triumphant refutation. It follows therefore, and is admitted, that the basis of our circulation is mixed--part of it, which fluctuates, being the representative of these precious “pounds,” and the larger portion being based on credit, or inconvertible government securities. What is the use then of arguing about a “pound,” when our paper, if called in, could not by any possibility realise it? We do not in the slightest degree deprecate the discussion at a future time; on the contrary, we most earnestly hope that the whole subject may engage the early attention of the next Parliament, for we are thoroughly convinced that the more it is sifted, the more clear and palpable will become the fallacies of our financial empiric. But we frankly avow our anxiety that he may not be permitted through such a begging of the question, to escape from his present difficulties. Let him show, if he can, that his Act of 1844 was the natural and inevitable result of his previous measures, and then we may be in a situation to condemn the whole of them together. But if it is not so, but a mere device of his own to show his admirable mechanical skill, let him defend it on its own merits. That it has acted banefully on the currency, no man can deny. It is quite clear that it has led to an enormous depreciation of property; and the very fact, that, notwithstanding the unprecedented pressure, the general credit has been maintained, is above all others the strongest proof that the pressure was utterly uncalled for. The point for immediate consideration simply resolves itself into this: are we to leave untouched upon the statute-book, a law which can at any time expose us to the inevitable hardship of a monetary crisis like the present?--Are we to continue and approve of an Act, the operation of which is, in