British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Flanders -- History, Military; Great Britain -- History, Military -- 18th century
Moselle within a few days’ march. Kilmain had been recalled after the
retreat from Cæsar’s camp, and replaced by General Houchard in supreme
command. Among Houchard’s subordinate generals was Jourdan. Dunkirk
itself had for commandant General Souham, an energetic officer whose
fame was soon to spread wide; and one of Souham’s battalions was
commanded by Lazare Hoche.
Thus new men and a new principle of war, which were to crush the
cordon-system out of existence, hung like an angry cloud to the south of
Dunkirk; but the Generals of the Allies took no heed. Murray, indeed,
had heard with anxiety of the increase of the French force in his front,
and had begged Coburg for reinforcements, which, however, could not be
spared.[154] On the east Coburg was busy besieging Quesnoy, with corps
of observation thrown out to east and west. He had called up eight
thousand men under General Beaulieu from Namur to strengthen his weak
cordon about Bouvines and Orchies; but to west of Beaulieu the space
from Lannoy to Menin was guarded by some thirteen thousand
Dutch—spiritless, disaffected troops, whose leader, the Prince of
Orange, was half inclined to give up the contest because he could obtain
no assurance as to his indemnity. West of the Dutch was the gossamer
line of Freytag, and behind it lay the Duke of York, conscious, first,
that Souham had opened the sluices, and that the steady rise of the
inundation would shortly sever his communication with Freytag; secondly,
that his right flank was under perpetual menace from the French
gunboats; and thirdly, that his rear was insecure, since there was
nothing to hinder the French from moving troops by sea. In this
situation he was trying to take a fortress, which he was not strong
enough to invest and which the enemy could consequently reinforce at any
moment, by attacking it upon one side only without heavy artillery. He
endeavoured to protect his flanks by throwing up entrenchments in the
Dunes, but found that they filled with water at the depth of two feet;
and he was fain to disarm a frigate at Nieuport and bring up her heavy
guns to the front, in order to arm batteries, not only against the town,
but towards the sea, to drive away the French gunboats. Thus at the
beginning of September he was able to open fire; ◆Aug. 27.◆ but
meanwhile Houchard had not been idle, for on the 27th he fell in force
upon the posts of Beaulieu and the Prince of Orange at Cysoing and
Tourcoing. He was beaten back by Beaulieu with the loss of four guns;
but the Dutch abandoned Tourcoing with suspicious alacrity, and would
have retired to Tournai and Courtrai had not Murray sent a detachment to
support them. “There is ill-will and disinclination to favour our
present operations,” wrote Murray; and indeed the fact is hardly
surprising.[155] The marvel is that he and the Duke of York should have
remained in so dangerous a position, when a successful attack by the
enemy upon the Dutch and a bold push forward would have carried the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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