British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Flanders -- History, Military; Great Britain -- History, Military -- 18th century
Thereupon there followed the usual distribution of troops into a
cordon. The besieging force numbered fourteen thousand, the covering
army, including twelve thousand Dutch, twenty-six thousand men; and to
the Duke of York was entrusted the task of protecting Flanders along
a front of some forty-five miles, from Cysoing to Nieuport. For this
purpose Coburg gave him about sixteen thousand Austrian troops in
addition to those in the pay of Britain; but, owing to the vagaries
of the British Minister for War, the corps was exposed to the most
dangerous risk. Hardly had the eight reinforcing battalions from
England joined the army in Flanders, before Dundas ordered four of them
to return at once, and the remainder as soon as possible. Further,
not content even with this, he gave Murray to understand that the
embarkation of the Hessian corps from Flanders was only deferred, and
hinted that a part of his artillerymen might also be spared for Toulon.
Now Dundas knew perfectly well that the troops had passed through a
very severe campaign, had fought several actions and had suffered
heavy losses; he knew perfectly well that no adequate steps had been
taken for filling up the gaps in the ranks; he could hardly have been
ignorant that winter was approaching; and Murray had twice warned him
that the French were rapidly increasing their forces between Lille and
the sea. Yet the Minister, though he had given the generals nominally
a free hand, calmly withdrew battalion after battalion, until at last
Murray told him plainly of the danger of the situation. The state of
the army was most distressing: the force in British pay was reduced
to twelve thousand fighting men, or less than half of its original
numbers; the sick and wounded of the whole army under the Duke’s
command numbered at least nine thousand, or more than one-fourth; the
troops were dangerously dispersed along a very wide front; and, though
Murray did not mention this, the Austrian Government had deprecated
all field-fortification, on account of the damage that might ensue to
meadows and the banks of canals.[175] Finally, he gave warning that, if
the enemy made an attack, the Duke would be obliged to abandon Ostend.
Dundas’s reply to this was very characteristic. Without a word to
Murray he ordered the Commandant at Ostend to retain the second batch
of four battalions which, by his own order, had been sent there for
re-embarkation to England; and he wrote an angry letter to Abercromby,
a subordinate officer, first expressing horror at the idea of
abandoning Ostend, and then regretting that attempts had been made to
keep those same four battalions in Flanders. “It would be impossible,”
he wrote, “to restrain the just indignation of the country, if, for the
sake of feeding an army under a Prince of the blood, so substantial an
interest to this country as that of the French West Indies had been
sacrificed.”[176]
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