British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Flanders -- History, Military; Great Britain -- History, Military -- 18th century
undistinguished by birth or intellect, and without the smallest
pretension to military ability.
Little less dangerous was the enormous encouragement given to crimping
by the sudden demand from all quarters for recruits. The Navy, as has
been seen, was unable to find its complement of men for the fleet,
despite the fact that the Common Council of London in January 1793
had offered an additional bounty of two pounds to seamen;[199] and
now there was thrown into competition with the press-gang a race of
greedy, unscrupulous scoundrels, some of them holding and disgracing
the King’s commission, who made profit out of every boy or man that
they could lay hold of by fair means or foul. Thus the ranks were
filled, as Tarleton phrased it, with infancy and dotage; recruiting
became a mere matter of gambling; and the price of men rose to thirty
pounds a head.[200] So large a sum set a premium on every description
of rascality in the trepanning of recruits by violence or by guile;
and the ordinary Englishman does not lightly bear with oppression of
this kind. At length, on one day in August, an unfortunate lunatic, who
had been enlisted by a sergeant and locked up in a brothel—the synonym
for a recruiting-house—in London, hurled himself out of a window in
the third story, into the street. Instantly a mob assembled, which
delivered a succession of riotous attacks upon all houses of this
description, and was only suppressed, after several days of disorder,
by the calling out of the Guards and six regiments of cavalry.[201]
Pitt defended the system on the ground that the Navy as well as the
Army would be manned, by the turning over of soldiers to reinforce the
marines; but this is only another instance of Pitt’s callous ignorance
and self-deception. The truth is that while doing nothing, and probably
worse than nothing, for the Navy, it destroyed the efficiency of the
Army for a time, and but for the timely interposition of a capable
soldier would have destroyed it permanently. Who was responsible for
the introduction of the system it is not easy to say, for there were
so many disgraceful circumstances attending it that the whole subject
was hushed up, and is now extremely obscure; but assuredly it was not
Lord Amherst, nor is it credible that it can have been any soldier. It
is safe to assert that it was the work of civilians; and if we seek
among the civilians at the War Office for the two men of tried conceit,
unwisdom, and incapacity, we can find them at once in Sir George Yonge
and Henry Dundas.[202]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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