Others have accused him of suppressing and falsifying legal documents. (_See_ Chisholm Anstey’s “Supposed Constitutional Restraints.”) Chief Justice Best from the Bench said, “I am afraid that we should get rid of a good deal of what is considered law in Westminster Hall if what Lord Coke says _without authority_ is not law.” 2 Bing, 296. One other case which afterwards told heavily upon women we may note. “Coke artfully inserted in the marriage settlement of his fourth son John, with the daughter and heiress of Anthony Wheatley, a clause of reversion to _his own heirs_ to the exclusion of heirs female, which was not discovered until 1671, when John having died, leaving seven daughters, their mother’s paternal inheritance passed away from them to their uncle Robert, Coke’s fifth son.” “His legal propositions may often be unsound in substance, but in his mode of stating what he believes or wishes to be law he often reaches the perfection of form” (Dict. Nat. Biography). This “_form_” may be sufficient to satisfy legal technicalities, but I think I have brought forward enough to show that intelligent women have reason to object to him as a “tainted” authority. [vii.] Coke tells us in his “Fourth Institute,” what properties a Parliament man should have. “He should have three properties of the elephant; first, that he hath no gall; second, that he is inflexible and cannot bow; third, that he is of a most ripe and perfect memory. First to be without gall, that is without malice, rancour, heat and envy.” We have shown that Coke was deficient in the first quality prescribed by himself for just judgment. His abject submission to the Archbishop after his Breach of the Canon Law, shows that he could bow very low to escape the consequences of his wrongdoing; his groveling in the dust before James, when he had roused the King to wrath, shows that he could do the same when he thought he was right, “from which we may learn that he was, as such men always are, as dejected and fawning in adversity as he was insolent and overbearing in prosperity” (Chalmers’ “Biography”). We must now prove that he was deficient in the third quality also. His memory was imperfect. He forgot one Statute when he was criticising another; he forgot what he had written in the “Second Institute,” when he was preparing his manuscript for the Fourth. It is only by self-contradiction that he can hold the opinion now under discussion. From his own works we must judge him on this count (Coke _v._ Coke). In the “Fourth Institute,” 5, he classifies women with minors. In the “Second Institute,” c. iii., 96, his authorised and corrected work, he says on the contrary, “Seeing that a _feme sole_ that cannot perform knight’s service may serve by deputy, it may be demanded wherefore an heir male being within the age of twenty-one years may not likewise serve by deputy. To this it is answered, that in cases of minoritie all is one to both sexes, _viz._, if the heire