male be at the death of the ancestor under the age of one and twenty years, or the heire female under the age of fourteen, they can make no deputy, but the Lord will have wardship. Therefore, Littleton is here to be understood of a _feme sole_ of full age and seized of land, holden by knight’s service,[15] either by purchase or descent.” One would have thought this clear enough for a legal mind to follow. Women do not, therefore, come into the same class as minors in regard to their appointing deputies. But they do come into the class of Electors. (“Second Institute,” 119.) “A woman may be a free suitor to the Courts of the Lord, and though it be generally said that the free Suitors be Judges [viii.] in these courts, this is intended of men and not of women.” Footnote 15: In discussing the “Parliament of Marlebridge” (52 Henry III., chap, vi., p. 3) he says: “Albeit the heir be not _primogenitus_, but an heir female, or male lineal or collateral, yet everyone of them be within the same mischief.” We have already noted the illegal character of this opinion; but we repeat it here intentionally. Coke does not see that in avoiding one of the horns of a dilemma he throws himself on the other. If “women could be suitors,” and were “not intended to be judges” or pares, the only other duty left them as suitors, would be “to elect their knights of the shire!” The study of the original statutes supports the freedom of women as to both duties, as well as the fact of their having exercised that freedom. In Howell’s “State Trials,” 19 (Entinck _v._ Carrington, 6 George III.), there is a question asked and answered, worthy of repetition here—“Can the judges extrajudicially make a thing law to bind the Kingdom by a declaration that such is their opinion? I say no. It is a matter of impeachment for any judge to affirm it. There must be an antecedent principle or authority from whence this opinion may be fairly collected, otherwise the opinion is null, and nothing but ignorance can excuse the judge that subscribed it.” That women had to submit then is no reason that they should submit now, as the same case explains—“It would be strange doctrine to assert that all the people of this land were bound to acknowledge that as universal law which a few had been afraid to dispute.”