In Hilary Term, 1739, the case of Olive _v._ Ingram was heard before Sir William Lee, Chief-Justice, Sir Francis Page, Sir Edmund Probyn, Sir William Chappel, Justices, to decide whether a woman could vote for a sexton, and whether she could be a sexton. A woman candidate for the office of sexton of the Church of St. Botolphs without Bishopsgate had 169 _indisputable_ votes and 40 _women’s votes_; the plaintiff had 174 indisputable votes and 22 women’s votes. The woman had been declared elected. The case was considered so important that it was heard four times. First, whether a woman could vote? The counsel against argued that women could not vote in this case, as they did not do so in others; that they did not vote for members of Parliament, quoting Coke. The counsel for argued that non-user did not imply inability; that women paying Scot and Lot had a right to vote on municipal affairs; that they voted in the great Companies; that it had been decided in Attorney-General _v._ Nicholson that women had a right to elect a preacher. If they could elect to a higher office, how could they not do so to a lower? It had been decided in Holt _v._ Lyle and Catharine _v._ Surrey, according to Hakewell, “that a _feme sole_, if she has a freehold, may vote for a Parliament man.” Women did come to the old County Courts, though not compellable thereto. Women are _sui juris_ till they are married. The Lord Chief-Justice said the case of Holt _v._ Lyle is a very strong case, but as I am not bound now to say whether a woman can vote for a Parliament man, I will reserve that point for further consideration. The question here is, whether a woman can be included in “all _persons_ paying Scot and Lot.” It was a just rule that they who contributed to maintain the elected should themselves be electors. There is a difference between exemption and incapacity. If women are qualified to pay Scot and Lot, they are qualified to keep a sexton. They who pay must determine to whom they will pay. He decided that women could vote for a sexton. Justice Page agreed with Chief-Justice Lee on the general question, but added, “I see no disability in a woman for voting for a Parliament man.” Justice Probyn agreed that they who pay have a right to nominate. It _might be thought_ that it required an _improved understanding_ for a woman to vote for a Parliament man, but the case of Holt _v._ Lyle was a very strong case. The woman having thus secured a majority of “indisputable votes,” the next question was, could she hold office? The objection was that women could not hold places of trust, of exertion, of anything to do with a church.