decline; and it teaches us what we should never forget, how terrible and decisive, in modern warfare, are the results of rapid and great success, and how absolutely necessary it is for England, in the present menacing condition of Europe, to surround herself with an invulnerable shield, to look after her national defences, and to take care that by sea and on land she shall possess the means of repelling aggression. It would be an unnecessary and unprofitable task to examine at length the causes of the war. Impartial history, we believe, will pronounce that though Napoleon gave the challenge, it had been to some degree provoked by the policy of Bismark, by the attitude recently taken by Prussia, by the series of events which since 1866 have changed the centre of power in Germany. It was impossible but that the Emperor should feel bitterly how he had been outwitted by the unscrupulous statesman who had purchased his complicity in the spoliation of Denmark by promises of annexation on the Rhine, and had afterwards coolly violated his pledges; nor yet that he should not be really alarmed at the immense development of the military power of Prussia during the preceding five years. It would have been disregarding the traditions which, rightly or wrongly, for two centuries have guided the foreign policy of France, to have witnessed the absorption of the German States into one dominant and threatening power, without an effort to break the union; and if an attempt to obtain this, was contrary to modern ideas and aspirations, it was only carrying out what had always been the views of Henry IV. and Richelieu. Besides, ever since the battle of Sadowa, France and Prussia had been watching each other, and tending inevitably to collision; both Powers had been increasing their armaments, and events have proved which was the more ready; and we know from the Imperial correspondence that Napoleon had been repeatedly warned that Prussia was meditating an invasion of France, and would avail herself of the first opportunity. It is not, therefore, too much to say that it was not merely French folly and arrogance which precipitated this tremendous conflict; the conduct of Prussia and her aggressive acts contributed to it in no slight degree; and if France, as it has turned out, was unwise in not accepting accomplished facts, and in chafing at the military strength of her rival, we can perfectly comprehend this sentiment, without charging her, as a nation, with any peculiar turn for aggrandisement, or even any extraordinary ambition. It must be admitted that the Emperor was utterly in the wrong in the pretext on which he declared war, and that his whole policy in this respect showed ignorance of the real state of opinion. After the Hohenzollern candidature of Spain had been withdrawn at the instance of England, it was an act of extreme unwisdom to have proceeded to further demands; and the result was that, to outward seeming, France, at the beginning of hostilities,