France,' between the Vosges and the Jura; and it connected itself with MacMahon's rear-guard along the Rhine and Lower Alsace. The whole French army, in its first line, extended in a huge semicircle from Northern Lorraine to the Southern Vosges; but its second line, massed between Metz and Chalons, was at a considerable distance from the first; and though it was well connected by railways, and placed as it was, it threatened equally the Rhenish provinces and Southern Germany, it was not yet even nearly concentrated. Such was the disposition of the army of the Rhine about the 21st or 22nd of July. It will be seen at once that it was well adapted for an offensive movement against Germany, if made rapidly and in full force, for Baden and the Palatinate were threatened, and the exact point of attack was concealed. Placed as they were, the forces of France could either pour into the Rhineland, drawing after them their reserves on all sides, or they could cross the Rhine, and, advancing from Strasburg, interpose between Northern and Southern Germany and endeavour to break up their uniting armies. On the other hand, the position of the French was badly chosen as a line of defence; for their foremost corps were widely disseminated, and in case of a sudden attack, were thrown too far beyond their supports; and if they were assailed by a resolute foe, converging against them in full strength, they would be exposed to serious disaster. For these reasons we may certainly infer that the strategic plan of the French Emperor was to march upon the Germans with much rapidity, and whether the recently published pamphlet does or does not disclose his purpose, it is evident that he intended to advance either by the Rhineland on Landau and Mayence, or by Strasburg into the territory of Baden. Besides, he must have known perfectly well that a brilliant initiative was his best chance; for not only was it in accordance with the traditions and genius of the French soldier; not only was it calculated to sow dissensions and alarm among his foes and perhaps prevent them from combining; it was the sole means to give full effect to the one great advantage which France would possess over Prussia at the beginning of a campaign, the imposing strength of a standing army, supposed to be ready at all points and formidable in its numerical proportions, compared with levies, immense indeed when brought together and set in motion, but believed to be inferior in military power, and requiring time to be fully arrayed. It may therefore be said with confidence, that a sudden and vigorous spring on Germany was the real scheme of Napoleon III.; and, notwithstanding all that has occurred, it is impossible to say what the result would have been had this design been carried out boldly, with the promptness and skill of a great commander who would have led his troops to immediate victory. Unhappily, however, for the interests of France, vacillation at the