British Quarterly Review, American Edition, Vol. LIII: January and April, 1871Various
History
British Quarterly Review, American Edition, Vol. LIII: January and April, 1871
Various
English periodicals
The affair at Weissenburg was only the prelude of operations of a more
serious kind. The 5th of August was spent by the Crown Prince in
bringing the mass of his troops forward, and in arraying them for a
formidable attack on the French forces in his immediate front. There can
be no doubt that in making these dispositions he exposed his flank to
the corps of De Failly, which, stationed at Bitsche, beyond the Vosges,
ought to have combined with that of McMahon, and fallen on the right of
the Prussian commander, while, as yet, his columns were not closed up,
and his whole line was somewhat out of order. This movement, however,
was not executed; the want of intelligence and the vacillation which
characterised the operations of the French, were again too painfully
conspicuous; and though De Failly sent one division through the hill
passes to the aid of his colleague, he remained at Bitsche with the bulk
of his troops, and left MacMahon completely isolated. Meanwhile that
brave, but unfortunate chief, made preparations to resist the attack of
the Germans, now evidently impending. It is a misconception to suppose,
as some have done, that he advanced recklessly against his foe; what he
did was to take and occupy a defensive position on the flank of the
Germans, where he could hope to give them battle, under circumstances of
the least disadvantage, and De Failly, if he wished, could come to his
aid; and we assert, with confidence, that this strategy was the best
open to the Duke of Magenta. The marshal by the evening of the 5th had
drawn up his forces along the crest of a range which extends from
Reichsofen on the left by Woerth to Elsasshausen, and Marbronn on the
right, and which, with the stream of the Sauer in front, and with broken
ground along the rising slopes, formed a strong position against his
enemy. MacMahon's object evidently was to compel the Germans to turn
against him, and assail him as they changed their front; he would thus
divert them from the road to Strasburg, and engage them as favourably
for himself as possible; and at the same time, he as it were summoned
the corps of De Failly to join his rear, while he kept open several
lines of retreat. These were the arrangements of an able commander; and
considering that MacMahon had not more than 50,000 men in his band, his
dispositions certainly give proof of the tactical skill for which he is
renowned. On the morning of the 6th, the Crown Prince advanced to the
attack, with 130,000 men, and not less than 440 guns. As MacMahon had
calculated, the change of front, which the Germans were compelled to
make, threw their line for some time into confusion; and the French
repelled for several hours a somewhat feeble and disunited effort
against their left, at and near Reichsofen. Meantime the French centre
at Woerth had been engaged; there too, for a considerable time,
MacMahon's divisions resisted stoutly, and even for a moment assumed the
offensive.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account