British Quarterly Review, American Edition, Vol. LIV: July and October, 1871Various
History
British Quarterly Review, American Edition, Vol. LIV: July and October, 1871
Various
English periodicals
We must therefore ask the positivist for his warrant, on the one hand,
in denying the existence of a world of substance, underneath the
fleeting phenomena of being, _out of which a revelation may emerge_,
apprehensible by man; and on the other, in denying to man positive
knowledge of the infinite as a substance. We must remind him that
infinite and finite, absolute and relative, substance and phenomena,
are terms of a relation: while we ask him for his warrant in
differentiating these terms, and proclaiming that the one set are
knowable and known, the others unknown and unknowable. He arbitrarily
singles out one of the two factors which together constitute a
relation, and are only known as complementary terms, and he bestows
upon it a spurious honour, by proclaiming that it alone is
intelligible, while he relegates the other term to the region of
darkness. We ask him on what ground he does so? and whether the law of
contrast does not render phenomena as unintelligible, without
substance, as substance without phenomena? Can we pronounce the one to
be known and the other unknown, merely because the former reaches us
through the five gateways of sense, and the latter through the avenue
of intuition? Now, no wise theist ever asserted that God was
phenomenally known. God is no phenomenon, but the noumenal essence
underlying all phenomena. We have admitted and contended that no study
of the laws of the universe can give us direct information as to the
first cause; for a first cause could never be revealed to the senses,
nor be an inference deduced from the data which sense supplies. The
assertion therefore, that nature (of which the physical sciences are
the interpretation) does not reveal God by its phenomena, is as
strongly asserted by the theist as by the positivist. It may reveal
his footprints, but we only know whose foot has left its mark on
nature when we have learned _from another source_ that He _is_. As
little, however, can the laws of nature discredit faith in a first
cause, which springs from a region at once beneath, above, and beyond
phenomena. And our theistic faith is not an _inference_; it is a
_postulate_: an axiomatic truth, affirmed on the report of that
intuition, of which the root is planted so firmly in the soil of
consciousness, that no form of the positivist philosophy can tear it
thence. Let science, therefore, march as it will, and where it will,
being hemmed in by the very laws of the universe which give rise to
it, and of which it is the exposition, it cannot interfere with or
encroach upon the theistic intuition. If there be a region behind
phenomena and their laws, accessible to knowledge or to philosophic
faith, no conclusion gathered from the scientific survey can touch it,
whether to discredit or attest.
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