British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854Morison, J. L. (John Lyle)
History
British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854
Morison, J. L. (John Lyle)
Canada -- Politics and government -- 1841-1867
There is perhaps a tendency to underestimate the work of his
predecessors and assistants in preparing the way, but no one can doubt
that it was Elgin's persistence in urging the treaty on the home
Cabinet, and his wonderful diplomatic gifts, which ultimately won the
day. Oliphant, certainly, had no doubt as to his chief's share in the
matter. "He is the most thorough diplomat possible--never loses sight
for a moment of his object, and while he is chaffing Yankees, and
slapping them on the back, he is systematically pursuing that
object";[32] and again, "There was concluded in {222} exactly a
fortnight a treaty, to negotiate which had taxed the inventive genius
of the Foreign Office, and all the conventional methods of diplomacy,
for the previous seven years."[33]
It was a long, slow process by which Elgin restored the tone of
Canadian loyalty. Frenchmen who had dreamed of renouncing allegiance
he won by his obvious fairness, and the recognition accorded by him to
their leaders. He took the heart out of Irish disaffection by his
popular methods and love of liberty. Tory dissentients fell slowly in
to heel, as they found their governor no lath painted to look like
iron, but very steel. To desponding Montreal merchants his reciprocity
treaty yielded naturally all they had expected from a more drastic
change. It is true that, owing to untoward circumstances, the treaty
lasted only for the limited period prescribed by Elgin; but it tided
over an awkward interval of disaffection and disappointment.
He did more, however, than cure definite phases of Canadian
disaffection; his influence through Earl Grey told powerfully for a
fuller and more optimistic conception of empire. With all its virtues,
the bureaucracy of the Colonial Office did not understand the
government of colonies such {223} as Canada; and where colonial
secretaries had the ability and will, they had not knowledge sufficient
to lead them into paths at once democratic and imperial. Even Grey
relapsed on occasion from the optimism which empire demands of its
statesmen. It was not simply that he emphasized the wrong
points--military and diplomatic issues, which in Canada were minor and
even negligible matters; but at times he seemed prepared to believe
that the days of the connection were numbered.[34]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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