British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854Morison, J. L. (John Lyle)
History
British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854
Morison, J. L. (John Lyle)
Canada -- Politics and government -- 1841-1867
The Union came into force on the tenth of February, but long before
that time all the diverse political interests in Canada had organized
themselves for the fray. Sydenham himself naturally occupied the
foremost place. He was acting now, not merely as governor-general, but
as the prime minister of a new cabinet, and as a party manager, {101}
whose main duty it was to secure parliamentary support for his men and
his measures by the maintenance of a sound central group. By the
beginning of the year he thought he had evidence for believing that, in
Upper Canada, a great majority of the members would be men who had at
heart the welfare of the province, and the British connection, and who
desired to make the Act of Union operate to the advantage of the
country.[32] But even in Upper Canada there were doubtful elements.
The Family Compact men, few as they might be in number, were unlikely
to leave their enemy, the governor-general, in peace; nor were all the
Reformers prepared to acquiesce in Sydenham's very restrained and
limited interpretation of responsible government. Late in 1840, and
early in 1841, the Upper Canadian progressives had organized their
strength; and additional significance was given to their action by
their communications with Lower Canada.[33] There, indeed, was the
crux of the experiment. The French Canadians, already organized in
sullen opposition, had just received what they counted a fresh insult.
But Sydenham may be allowed to {102} explain his own action. "There
were," he wrote to Russell in March, 1841, "attached to the cities,
both of Montreal and Quebec, very extensive suburbs, inhabited
generally by a poor population, unconnected with the mercantile
interests to which these cities owe their importance. Had these cities
been brought within the electoral limits, the number of their
population would have enabled them to return one, if not both, of the
members for each city. But such a result would have been directly at
variance with the grounds on which increased representation was given
by Parliament to these cities. On referring to the discussions which
took place in both houses when the Union Bill was before them, I find
that members on all sides laid great stress on the necessity of
securing ample representation to the mercantile interests of Canada....
Feeling myself, therefore, bound in duty to carry out the views of the
British parliament in this matter, _I was compelled in fixing the
limits of Quebec and Montreal to transfer to the county a large portion
of the suburbs of each_."[34] Whatever Sydenham's intentions may have
been, the actual result of his action was to secure for his party four
seats in the very heart of the enemy's country; {103} and the French
Canadians, naturally embittered, resented the governor's action as a
piece of gerrymandering, which had practically disfranchised many
French voters. Already, in 1840, under the active leadership of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854 — John Shaqi
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