British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854Morison, J. L. (John Lyle)
History
British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854
Morison, J. L. (John Lyle)
Canada -- Politics and government -- 1841-1867
conviction that one party alone cared for Britain--the former Family
Compact men. When he bade Bagot disregard party divisions in his
choice of ministers, he was unconsciously limiting Bagot's choice to a
very little circle, all of them most unmistakably displeasing to the
populace, whose wishes he professed to be willing to consult. He
claimed to be a man of principle--mistaking the clearness of
doctrinaire ignorance for the certainty of honest knowledge.
Happily the governor-general of Canada was not in this sense a man of
principle. He observed, took counsel, and began to shape his own
policy. It is not easy to describe that policy in a sentence, or even
to make it absolutely clear. He had come out to Canada, forewarned
against Baldwin and the school of constitutionalists associated with
him; and the warning made him reluctant to consent to their ideas. He
had been advised to draw his councillors from all directions, and his
naturally moderate spirit approved a policy of judicious selection.
But the noteworthy feature in the line of action which he ultimately
followed was that he allowed his diplomatic instincts to overbalance
the advice imposed on him by the British ministry. {144} In selecting
individuals for his councils, he almost unconsciously followed the
wishes of Baldwin and his party, until, at the end, he found himself in
the hands of resolute advocates of responsible government, and did
nothing to withstand their doctrine. But this is to anticipate events,
and to simplify what was actually a process involved in some confusion.
He filled two vacant places--one with the most brilliant of reforming
financiers, Francis Hincks, whose merits he saw at once; the other,
after a gentlemanly refusal from Cartwright, with Sherwood, a sound but
comparatively moderate Conservative from Upper Canada. In an admirable
letter to Stanley at the beginning of the summer, he outlined his
policy. Stanley, ever fearful of rash experiments, warned him that a
combination of black and white does not necessarily produce grey. To
this he answered: "My hope is that, circumstanced as I am, I possibly
may be able to do this, that is, to take from all sides the best and
fittest men for the public service.... The attempt to produce such a
grey, whether it succeed or not, must, I think, after all that has
passed, and at this particular crisis in which I find myself here, be
the safest line."[16] Stanley, then, limited his {145} choice of men,
and in the event of a crisis, was prepared that he should risk a defeat
and the violent imposition of an alien ministry, on the chance that
such a reverse might provoke a loyalist uprising to defend the British
connection. Baldwin dreamed of a consistently Radical cabinet.
MacNab, with his eyes shut to the consequences, seems to have
considered a leap in the dark--a coalition between his men and the
French Canadians. Bagot, as opportunist as the Tories, but opportunist
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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