British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854Morison, J. L. (John Lyle)
History
British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854
Morison, J. L. (John Lyle)
Canada -- Politics and government -- 1841-1867
Yet, so far as Canada was concerned, Bagot had reason to feel
satisfied. Threatened with half a dozen hostile combinations, he had
forestalled them all, and found the Assembly filled with friends, not
enemies. He had approached a sullen French nation--and thereafter the
French party formed as solid an accession to Canadian political
stability as they had once been dangerous to Imperial peace; and their
union with the moderate reformers in government, while it gave them all
they asked, enabled the governor to exercise a natural restraint on
them, should they again be tempted to nationalist excesses. He had not
explicitly surrendered to any sweeping doctrine of responsible
government. There was peace at last. The Assembly which passed over
thirty acts, reaffirmed the rights of the royal prerogative, and {154}
was dismissed in the most amiable temper with itself, and the
governor-general.
One may discern, however, a curious contradiction between the
superficial consequences of the crisis, as described by Bagot, and the
fundamental changes the beginnings of which he was able to trace in the
months which followed. On the face of it, Bagot's policy of frank
expediency had saved Stanley and his party from a crushing defeat and a
humiliating surrender to extreme views. So far, he had assisted the
cause of conservatism. But the disaster and the humiliation would have
come, not from the grant of responsible government, but from the misuse
of it to which a victory, won against a more resolute governor, might
have tempted Baldwin and La Fontaine, and from the false position in
which the imperial government would have stood, towards the men who had
challenged imperial authority and won. It is interesting to follow the
process by which Bagot came to see all that lay in his action.
Yielding to Canadian autonomy, he went on to new surrenders. He had
already warned Stanley that the agitation over the Civil List would
certainly reawaken; to the end he seems to have been considering the
advisability of a complete surrender {155} on that point. When he
wrote communicating to the minister the Assembly's acknowledgment of
the royal prerogative, in recognizing the right of the Crown to name
the capital, he pointed out that, prerogative or no prerogative, the
possessor of the purse had the final voice. He rebuked his new
minister, Baldwin, for tacking on question-begging constitutional
phrases to a legal opinion, but he told Stanley, quite frankly, that,
"whether the doctrine of responsible government is openly acknowledged,
or is only tacitly acquiesced in, _virtually it exists_."[26] During
the remainder of his tenure of office, partly because of his own
ill-health, but partly also, I think, from conviction, he gave his
ministers the most perfect freedom of action. And, although he did not
gain the point, he was willing to make sweeping concessions in answer
to the call for an amnesty for the rebels of 1837. He recognized the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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