Of this task the subjective part, and the entire fruitlessness of the same, have already been dealt with in another place. The objective division comprehends philosophy in the broadest sense of the word. For every theory and speculation as to the world may without exception be traced back to this one question: “How must the world be fashioned to render possible the fact that consciousness-contents, conscious ideals, concepts, exist--in fine, that the world exists _as such_?” In this question is comprehended all philosophy, as the tree is comprehended in the root. All the theories as to the constitution of the world that have ever been advanced or that will ever be advanced, branch into these two fundamental views:-- First: the view that at the foundation of things there exists a constant in itself, an unconditioned constant, an identical with itself, or whatever else one has a mind to name it. Second: the view that there exists no such unconditioned constant at the foundation of things, but that all that exists is merely a relation-value, and that the one single constant in the universe is the constant of relations formulated abstractly in scientific law. Now, to the impartial observer the world presents itself in a twofold aspect: on one hand as “something that is,” and on the other as “something that happens.” In the former of these two fundamental views, things would be something that _has_ happening, something that has this happening proceed forth from it. In the latter view, things would _be_ the happening itself, would resolve themselves completely into happening. As already set forth at length in what has gone before, this latter conception is that given for science as the mechanical world-theory. Science, if she would justify her title to the name, dare not accord recognition to anything concealed behind things, anything imperceptible to sense. If this be granted, “that which is” then becomes purely a form of “that which happens,” and the universe in its entirety one huge mass of relation-values. For a thing is perceptible to sense and therewith apprehensible only in so far as it enters into relations with other things, which includes, with my senses. Any third view is impossible, for, from the strictly epistemological standpoint, opposites, between them, always comprehend the whole. From the standpoint of strict epistemology, with any kind of thing as a concept--with the concept “tree” for example--all the rest of the world is given as “not-tree”--so completely given with it that the interpolation of any third concept is an utter impossibility. It may be asked, “In what do these two opposed fundamental views find their justification?”