It is the same with all the other faculties of our soul when compared with the most essential properties of matter. As the mind wills and commands, so the body obeys in every thing within its power. The mind forms, at pleasure, an intimate union with any object; neither distance, magnitude, nor figure, can obstruct this union, when the mind wills it, it is effected in an instant. The body can form no union; whatever touches it too closely injures it; it requires a long time in order to approach another body; it every where meets with resistance, and obstacles, and from the smallest shock its motion ceases. Is will then nothing more than a corporeal movement; and is contemplation but a simple contact? How could this contact take place upon a remote object or abstracted subjects? How could this movement be accomplished in an indivisible instant? Is it possible to have a conception of motion without having a conception of space and time? Will, therefore, if it be a motion, is not a material one; and if the union of the mind with its object be a contact, it is effected at a distance: and is not this contact a penetration? qualities which are absolutely opposite to those of matter, and which of consequence can only belong to the immaterial being. But I fear I have already dwelt too long on a subject which, by many, may be considered as foreign to our purpose; and it might be asked, "Ought Metaphysical Considerations on the Soul to find a place in a System of Natural History?" Were I conscious of abilities equal to the discussion of a topic so exalted, this reflection, I must own, would have little weight with me; and I have contracted my remarks only because I was afraid I should not be able to comprehend a subject so enlarged and so important in its full extent. Why retrench from the Natural History of Man the history of his noblest part? Why thus preposterously debase him; by considering him merely as an animal, while he is of a nature so different, and so superior, to that of the brutes, that those must be immersed in ignorance like the brutes themselves who ever thought of confounding them. Man, as to the material part of his existence, certainly bears a resemblance to other animals, and in comprehending the circle of natural beings there is a necessity for placing him in the class of animals. Nature, however, has neither classes nor species; it contains only individuals. These species and classes are nothing but ideas which we have ourselves formed and established, and though we place man in one of such classes we do not change his being; we do not derogate from his dignity; we do not alter his condition. In a word, we only place him at the head of those who bear a similitude to him in the material part of his being.