Campfire and battlefield : $b an illustrated history of the campaigns and conflicts of the great Civil WarRidpath, John Clark
History
Campfire and battlefield : $b an illustrated history of the campaigns and conflicts of the great Civil War
Ridpath, John Clark
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Campaigns; United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Pictorial works
There never was any question of the gallantry or patriotism of General
Burnside, but his woful lack of judgment in the conduct of the battle
of Fredericksburg (or perhaps it should be said, in fighting a battle
at that point at all) has ever remained inexplicable. His own attempt
to explain it, in his official report, is brief, and is at least manly
in the frankness with which he puts the entire blame upon himself. He
wrote: "During my preparations for crossing at the place I had first
selected, I discovered that the enemy had thrown a large portion of
his force down the river and elsewhere, thus weakening his defences in
front, and also thought I discovered that he did not anticipate the
crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg; and I hoped by rapidly
throwing the whole command over at that place to {197} separate, by a
vigorous attack, the forces of the enemy on the river below from the
forces behind and on the crest in the rear of the town, in which case
we could fight him with great advantage in our favor. To do this we
had to gain a height on the extreme right of the crest, which height
commanded a new road lately made by the enemy for purposes of more
rapid communication along his lines, which point gained, his positions
along the crest would have been scarcely tenable, and he could have
been driven from them easily by an attack on his front in connection
with a movement in the rear of the crest.... Failing in accomplishing
the main object, we remained in order of battle two days--long enough
to decide that the enemy would not come out of his strongholds to
fight us with infantry--after which we recrossed to this side of the
river unmolested, without the loss of men or property. As the day
broke, our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different
positions as if going on parade--not the least demoralization or
disorganization existed. To the brave officers and soldiers who
accomplished the feat of thus recrossing the river in the face of the
enemy, I owe everything. For the failure in the attack I am
responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by
them was never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been
possible. The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this
line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War,
and yourself, and that you left the whole movement in my hands,
without giving me orders, makes me the only one responsible."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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