Camps, Quarters, and Casual PlacesForbes, Archibald
History
Camps, Quarters, and Casual Places
Forbes, Archibald
Military camps; Military history, Modern
of which five were successful; of his twelve attempts to escalade six
succeeded. The Germans in 1870-71 never attempted a breach and their
solitary effort at escalade, on the Basse Perche of Belfort, utterly
failed.
The Russians in 1877 were even less enterprising than had been the
Germans in 1870. They went against three permanently fortified places,
the antediluvian little Matchin which if I remember right blew itself
up; the crumbling Nicopolis which surrendered after one day's fighting;
and Rustchuk which held out till the end of the war. They would not
look at Silistria, ruined, but strong in heroic memories; they avoided
Rasgrad, Schumla, and the Black Sea fortresses; Sophia, Philippopolis,
and Adrianople made no resistance. The earthworks of Plevna, vicious as
they were in many characteristics, they found impregnable. I think
Suvaroff would have carried them; I am sure Skobeleff would if he had
got his way.
The vastly expensive armaments of the present--the rifled
breech-loader, the magazine rifle, the machine guns, the long-range
field-guns, and so forth, are all accepted and paid for by the
respective nations in the frank and naked expectation that these
weapons will perform increased execution on the enemy in war time. This
granted, nor can it be denied, it logically follows that if this
increased execution is not performed nations are entitled to regard it
as a grievance that they do not get blood for their money, and this
they certainly do not have; so that even in this sanguinary particular
the warfare of to-day is a comparative failure. The topic, however, is
rather a ghastly one and I refrain from citing evidence; which,
however, is easily accessible to any one who cares to seek it.
The anticipation is confidently adventured that a great revolution will
be made in warfare by the magazine rifle with its increased range, the
machine gun, and the quick-firing field artillery which will speedily
be introduced into every service. It does not seem likely that
smokeless powder will create any very important change, except in siege
operations. On the battlefield neither artillery nor infantry come into
action out of sight of the enemy. When either arm opens fire within
sight of the enemy its position can be almost invariably detected by
the field-glass, irrespective of the smokelessness or non-smokelessness
of its ammunition. Indeed, the use of smokeless powder would seem
inevitably to damage the fortunes of the attack. Under cover of a bank
of smoke the soldiers hurrying on to feed the fighting line are fairly
hidden from aimed hostile fire. It may be argued that their aim is thus
reciprocally hindered; but the reply is that their anxiety is not so
much to be shooting during their reinforcing advance as to get forward
into the fighting line, where the atmosphere is not so greatly
obscured. Smokeless powder will no doubt advantage the defence.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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