Many modes of raising, maintaining, and drilling this force have been suggested; but as the principle was not adopted they are scarcely worth discussing. Drills for short periods are certainly of little or no avail; and if money cannot be borrowed to put 100,000 men in a state of readiness, the organisation of 50,000 men to be drilled for three months in each year in bodies of 12,000 or 15,000 does not seem at all unreasonable. The rate of wages in Canada is very high, and the lowest estimate for the support, pay, and clothing of a militiaman for six months comes to about £20 per man. It is, therefore, a simple sum in multiplication to arrive at the ultimate figure of Canadian _possumus_ in regard to the paying power of the Provinces. It is not true that if one man can be kept for £20 for six months two men can be kept for the same sum for three months. The levy of 50,000 militiamen for six months would cost Canada, if she were alone, one million sterling. Mr. Cartwright has pointed out that Canada could discipline 100,000 militia, with half a year’s instruction each, for as much as would support a standing army of 2,000 men for the same period. We may be very angry with the Canadians for their happy security. It is not so very long ago since the Duke’s letters to Sir John Burgoyne startled us out of a similar _insouciance_. We may feel that the sudden development of the United States has placed us in a very doubtful military position. It is not so easy to shake off the obligations incurred by conquest and by emigration under the flag of Great Britain. In the face of very frigid warnings from the press, and very lukewarm enunciations of policy from her best friends, Canada had some reason to fear that there is a secret desire “to let her slide,” and that nothing would please England so much as a happy chance which placed the Provinces beyond our care without humiliation or war.