Canada; its Defences, Condition, and Resources: Being a third and concluding volume of "My Diary, North and South"Russell, William Howard, Sir
History
Canada; its Defences, Condition, and Resources: Being a third and concluding volume of "My Diary, North and South"
Russell, William Howard, Sir
Canada -- Defenses; Canada -- Description and travel
If we look at the map of Upper Canada, the position of Paris at
once attracts the eye as a favourable site for the main body of
the defensive force; whilst Stratford and London, being points of
railway junction, would naturally be held as long as possible.
Guelph would serve as a point of concentration for troops obliged
to fall back from London or from Stratford, according to the
direction from which the enemy came. Toronto would become the
natural point of concentration for troops obliged to retire from
Guelph, and under the conditions necessitating such a retreat the
force defending the Niagara frontier would be obliged to fall back
upon Hamilton to the entrenched position covering that town. If
the Americans attack the western settlements near Georgian Bay,
it seems impossible to oppose them with assured advantage. A calm
consideration of the subject has led the best authorities to the
conclusion that we cannot hope at present to establish a naval
force on either Lake Huron or Lake Erie. The Welland Canal is,
in its present state, unsuited to the purposes of modern naval
warfare, and a canal is at all times, and under the most favourable
circumstances, very little to be depended upon. With the aid of
fortified harbours there is, however, no reason to fear for our
naval supremacy on Lake Ontario, and it is to that object our
best efforts should be directed. It would of course be impolitic
to leave Toronto and Hamilton open to naval demonstrations, but
the principal efforts of the authorities should be directed to
establish permanent works to protect Ottawa, Montreal, Kingston,
and Quebec, and to prepare positions for entrenched camps and
earthworks on the points most likely to be assailed.
It is plain that a navy alone can prevent descents on the land
line of such extensive waters, and that the possession of Rouse’s
Point enables the Americans to turn the line of the Richelieu and
threaten Montreal. Let us run rapidly over the positions, beginning
with the west. If works were thrown up at Goderich and Sydenham on
points there which are suitable for defensive positions, it might
be possible to check any adventurous force intent on speedy victory
and conquest; but no fortifications could be maintained on those
remote points for permanent occupation, as the enemy could operate
on the flanks and rear and turn them from Huron or Georgian Bay.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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