Under the circumstances in which the various distinct dependencies of the British Crown in the Continent of North America find themselves placed, it is not surprising that the idea of a Confederation for the purposes of common defence and military corroboration should have arisen. It is surprising that it should have floated about so long, and have stirred men to action so feebly. I think it is the first notion that occurs to a stranger visiting Canada and casting about for a something to put in place of the strength which distant England cannot, and Canadians will not, afford. At least, there is no sign as yet that the Canadians will quite arouse from a sleep which no fears disturb, although they hear the noise of robbers. They will not prepare for war, because they wish for peace, and it is plain enough that if war should come instead of peace, England would be too late to save them, because she would be too far. Now, let it not be supposed that any confederation of the Canadas and British North American provinces would yield such an increase of force as would enable the collective or several members of it to resist the force of the Republic of the Northern American United States--at least, not just now. But in the very conflict in which the Northern and Southern Confederations are engaged, we see the vast energy and resources of a union of States in war time as compared with the action of States not so joined:--France, Great Britain, Turkey, and Sardinia were associated in the war with Russia, but their power would have been much greater had they acted under a common head. There is in every association of the States the danger of ultimate convulsions, and of death itself, whenever the Constitution and ideas of one State differ from those of another: for the difference of constitution and ideas is sure to produce soon a conflict of interests and opinions which the bond of Federation cannot compress. In the two Canadas there are certain opposing principles at work which have interfered with harmonious action at times. These might receive greater vitality and power on each side if the cohesion of the British dependencies were not complete. The religious questions which now are mixed with questions of race would perhaps acquire development, and become more active and more mischievous. But the actual positive visible dangers of non-Confederation are more weighty than those which may come by-and-by from the adoption of a common central government subject to the Crown. Setting out with the principle of submission to the Throne--with the recognition of the sovereignty of the monarch of Great Britain and Ireland--with the full acknowledgment of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to the Crown--with the charters of their several and collective liberties in their possession, the only great schism to be apprehended is one which might arise from the exercise of Parliamentary control over the action of the Confederation, because