Captains of the Civil War: A Chronicle of the Blue and the GrayWood, William
History
Captains of the Civil War: A Chronicle of the Blue and the Gray
Wood, William
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Biography; United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Campaigns
On the twenty-eighth of April Stuart saw the redisciplined Federals
in motion far up the Rappahannock, while next day Jackson saw others
laying pontoons thirty miles lower down, just on the seaward side
of Fredericksburg. Lee took this news with genial calm, remarking
to the aide: "Well, I heard firing and was beginning to think it
was time some of your lazy young fellows were coming to tell me
what it was about. Tell your good general he knows what to do with
the enemy just as well as I do." On the thirtieth it became quite
clear that Hooker was bent on turning Lee's left and that he had
divided his army to do so. Jackson wished to attack Sedgwick's
35,000 Federals still on the plains of Fredericksburg. But Lee
convinced him that the better way would be to hold these men with
10,000 Confederates in the fortified position on the confronting
heights while the remaining 52,000 should try to catch Hooker himself
between the jaws of a trap in the forest round Chancellorsville,
where the Federal masses would be far more likely to get out of
hand. It was an extremely daring maneuver to be setting this trap
when Sedgwick had enough men to storm the heights of Fredericksburg,
when Stoneman was on the line of communication with the south,
and when Hooker himself, with superior numbers, was gaining Lee's
rear. But Lee had Jackson as his lieutenant, not Longstreet, as
he was to have at Gettysburg.
Hooker's movements were rapid, well arranged, and admirably executed
up to the evening of the first of May, when, finding those of the
enemy very puzzling among the dense woods, he chose the worst of
three alternatives. The first and best, an immediate counter-attack,
would have kept up his army's morale and, if well executed, revealed
his own greater strength. The second, a continued advance till he
reached clearer ground, might have succeeded or not. The third
and worst was to stand on his defense, a plan which, however sound
in other places, was fatal here, because it not only depressed
the spirits of his army but gave two men of genius the initiative
against him in a country where they were at home and he was not.
The absence of ten thousand cavalry baffled his efforts to get
trustworthy information on the ground, while the dense woods baffled
his balloons from above. On the second of May he still thought
the initiative was his, that the Confederates were retreating,
and that his own jaws were closing on them instead of theirs on
him.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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