Captains of the Civil War: A Chronicle of the Blue and the GrayWood, William
History
Captains of the Civil War: A Chronicle of the Blue and the Gray
Wood, William
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Biography; United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Campaigns
Throughout this campaign the army and navy of the Union worked
together as a single amphibious force. Grant's own words are no
mere compliment, but the sober statement of a fact. "The navy, under
Porter, was all it could be during the entire campaign. Without
its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made
with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been made
at all, in the way it was, with any number of men, without such
assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms
of the Service. There never was a request made, that I am aware
of, either of the Flag-Officer or any of his subordinates, that
was not promptly complied with." And what is true of Porter is at
least as true of Farragut, who was the greater man and the senior
of every one afloat.
Grant could take Vicksburg only by reaching good ground, and the
only good ground was below and in rear of the fortress. There was no
foothold for his army on the east bank of the Mississippi anywhere
between Memphis and Vicksburg. This meant that he must either start
afresh from Memphis and try again to push overland by rail or cross
the swampy peninsula in front of him and circle round his enemy. A
retirement on Memphis, no matter how wise, would look like another
great Union defeat and consequently lower a public morale which,
depressed enough by Fredericksburg, was being kept down by the
constant naval reverses that opened '63. Circling the front was
therefore very much to be preferred from the political point of view.
On the other hand, it was beset by many alarming difficulties; for it
meant starting from the flooded Mississippi and working through the
waterlogged lowlands, across the peninsula, till a foothold could be
seized on the eastern bank below Vicksburg. Moreover, this circling
attack, though feasible, might depress the morale of the troops by
the way. Burnside's disastrous "Mud March" through the January
sloughs of Virginia, made in the vain hope of outflanking Lee, had
lowered the morale of the army almost as much as Fredericksburg
itself had lowered the morale of the people.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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