During the halt of the armies there had arisen a grave doubt in the mind of Lord Raglan. Even on the beach of Kamishli, pondering on the task before him, he had come to question the practicableness of assailing Sebastopol from the north, and feared that "a flank movement to the south side would be necessary." Here, on the heights of the Alma, he seems to have felt the pressure of doubt more strongly; for on the 21st of September, probably at his suggestion, Sir John Burgoyne--who shared, if he did not originate his doubts--drew up a formal memorandum, setting forth all the advantages of a march round the head of the harbour to Balaclava on the south coast. And when the short march to the Katcha ended, a singular incident, reported at headquarters, gave the British officers fresh arguments. On the 22nd, steamers of both fleets had looked into Sebastopol harbour, and had reported that all the vessels of war were still there. They were, however, so posted as to attract the attention of naval men, who took particular note of a line of ships moored across the entrance to the harbour, from north to south. The next day, when the fleet came up from Cape Loukoul to the Katcha, the whole line of Russian ships was observed to settle down in the water until only their tops were visible. The enemy, at the suggestion of Admiral Korniloff, had thus disposed of part of a fleet with which he could not keep the sea, and a wise measure it proved to be. The news was sent at once to the headquarter camps on the Katcha, and it probably gave Lord Raglan an additional argument in favour of a march to the south side. The Allies halted on the Katcha until late on the 24th, when they advanced to the Belbek.