It was the morning of the 25th. The Allied camp spread out over the plateau, within three miles and a half of the nearest defences of Sebastopol. The question to be resolved was, Should they at once attack the northern works, or should they file through the rough woods and appear suddenly on the southern plateau? We have seen that Lord Raglan, as early as the 15th or 16th, doubted the ability of the Allies to carry the northern forts by a _coup de main_, and contemplated the other alternative; and that, the day after the battle of the Alma, he had set Sir John Burgoyne to draw up a memorandum, showing the advantages of the latter course. It is probable that these arguments were first placed before Marshal St. Arnaud at the bivouac on the Katcha; but the ultimate decision was not taken until the morning of the 25th, at the bivouac on the Belbek. After that St. Arnaud had declined to risk an assault. Early on the 25th Lord Raglan went to the quarters of Marshal St. Arnaud, who was now attacked by cholera, and too much broken to be able to take an active part; and in his presence, and that of General Canrobert and others, debated the project of Sir John Burgoyne. Certainly, all were not agreed; but Canrobert was not made of that stuff which leads a general to take upon himself the burden of a heavy responsibility, and he yielded to the arguments of the English. It was therefore ordered that the flank march should be undertaken forthwith; and for four-and-twenty hours the Allied armies were at the mercy of their opponents. Had Menschikoff possessed a spark of genius, he would have cut his enemies to pieces on the 25th of September; but he was employed on a movement of his own, when he ought to have been watching the enemy.