No place in the world could be more impregnable to an attack from the sea. At the mouth of the roadstead there were three mighty forts. On a low point of land, under the cliff on the northern side, rose the immense work named Fort Constantine, showing 110 guns, in three casemated tiers, with another tier on the roof. On the south shore, also low down, and having a good command of the sea, first the Quarantine Fort, with its sixty guns, and beyond that, Fort Alexander, with its ninety guns, defied all assailants, so that in first line, an invading fleet would have to encounter the fire of 260 guns, securely placed in solid works. Looking from the sea, these three forts impressed the beholder with the strength of the place. But these were not all. Beyond Alexander rose Fort Nicholas, armed with 110 guns; and beyond this, Fort Paul, with its eighty-six guns, standing at the mouth of the south bay. Altogether, there were no fewer than 700 guns looking towards the sea from their secure casemates. Nor should the small work, called the Wasp Battery, above Fort Constantine, improvised on the spur of the moment, be overlooked. It deserved its name. Such were the formidable defences which the allied fleets were to attack in wooden ships, and which some sanguine persons expected them to reduce to helplessness. No greater delusion could exist. The real hour of trial had now come. The batteries of the Allies were ready to open fire, and on the night of the 16th of October orders went forth from both headquarters that the embrasures should be unmasked in the obscurity of the dawn; that the troops in camp should be held in readiness to fall in at a moment's notice ready to storm; that the fire of the land batteries should open soon after six; and that the fleet, moving up, should assail the great forts overlooking the sea. Both admirals, it is understood, were opposed to this proceeding. They held the sound opinion that the fleet could not effect anything against the forts. The safety of the army, they said, depended on the safety of the fleet, and it would be imprudent to risk the fleet in an encounter with forts so well placed and so heavily armed. The mouth of the harbour was closed by the sunken ships. A shoal, running out in front of Fort Constantine, prevented the great men-of-war from placing themselves near enough to batter the walls with effect. The sailing ships must be towed or propelled by steamers, and would fight at a disadvantage. These arguments did not prevail. Admiral Hamelin was under the absolute command of General Canrobert, and not at liberty to disobey. Admiral Dundas was not under the absolute command of Lord Raglan; but he could not well refrain from executing his wishes, or look on while the French attacked. The allied generals were pressing in their orders, as they held that an attack from the sea would operate as a diversion, and favour the attack from the land. Therefore it was decided