the steep open downs to the east and west of the road to Sebastopol, and in the river, with its high banks and enclosures. Its weakness lay in its extent, compared with the number of troops at Prince Menschikoff's disposal. Here the Prince hoped to stop the march of the Allies, with the troops he had, until the divisions from the army of the Danube came up and drove them to their ships. To occupy the position he had 42 battalions, 16 squadrons of cavalry, 11 sotnias of Cossacks (1,100 lances), and 96 guns; that is, about 38,000 men of all arms. His infantry was 31,500, and his cavalry 3,400 strong, including the Cossacks. The remainder were artillerymen and sappers. In disposing of his forces, Prince Menschikoff placed the bulk on the right and centre. To strengthen the position the Prince had devised two fieldworks of the humblest kind. On the extreme right, just below the brow of the great hill there, he had thrown up an entrenchment, in the form of a flattened arrow-head; and on the lower slope of the same hill, nearer to the centre, he had constructed another fieldwork, the embrasures of which were formed by throwing up the earth on each hand. This he armed with the twelve (some say fourteen) heavy guns brought from Sebastopol. These two works were improperly called redoubts. The regiments were formed in column, chequer-wise, on each flank of the fieldworks, and were not all visible to the approaching army. The right of the Russian line was commanded by General Kvetzinsky, the centre by Prince Gortschakoff, the left by General Kiriakoff. It will be seen that the bulk of the troops and artillery were in position to the east of Telegraph Hill, that is, on the Russian right of the great road, while only one-third of the troops and one-fifth of the guns were on or in front of the Telegraph Hill, and towards the sea. Against this force and this position marched, in round numbers, about 63,000 men and 128 guns.