The force destined for the counter-attack should accordingly be detailed from the first. Efforts must be made, by using favourable country for the defensive front and thus being able to occupy it weakly, to spare every available man for the counter-attack, and to compensate for the weakness of the force in position by ample ammunition, well-arranged cross-fire, and similar measures. The troops designed to play the offensive rôle must first be placed in reserve, withdrawn, as far as possible, from view and fire of the enemy. As soon as the situation is cleared up, they will be placed in échelon behind that flank from which the counter-stroke will take place. Whether this will be a mounted or dismounted attack depends on the character of the ground and similar circumstances. In any case a base for attack outside the limits of the enemy's fire must be reached, and, where possible, by surprise. It is therefore of the highest importance that the enemy shall be prevented from gaining observation as to the conduct of the reserve, in order that its presence may eventually come as a surprise to him. Hostile patrols must be attacked with remorseless energy wherever seen, and, if possible, put out of action. Those look-out points, on the other hand, from which observation can be made of the enemy must be occupied early in the fight. The cavalry will, as a rule, only undertake a completely passive defence, where the object of the fight is to hold the crossing over some obstacle, to defend isolated localities, or to gain time. In such a case the question is one of the obstinate defence of a definite object, sometimes perhaps, also, of a retirement from one point to another. Such an operation, however, is always difficult to carry out on account of the led horses, and should only be attempted in very favorable country. It demands that the fight shall be broken off--always a difficult matter, and, to cavalry encumbered by their led horses, one of considerable danger. The horses certainly render it possible, by making a proper use of the ground, to withdraw more rapidly than could infantry in the same case. On the other hand, however, they tie the dismounted troops down to a definite direction of retreat, and remounting, when pressed by the enemy, is always a critical matter. 4. _Breaking off the Fight, Retreat, and Pursuit_ When it becomes apparent during the course of a fight that success cannot ensue, the commander must decide in good time whether he will carry the engagement through or break it off. To choose the right moment for the latter operation is generally extraordinarily difficult, even when it has been planned from the commencement. To make the necessary dispositions, also, demands great tactical skill. To continue the fight with determination, perhaps till nightfall, will often cost no greater sacrifice than the breaking off of the engagement and the attendant retreat.