If a position of readiness has at first to be taken up, as will generally be the case until it is known in what direction further developments will take place, it must be as secure as possible from the view and fire of the enemy, but must be one from which immediate action can be taken. A disposition in groups of units will generally be the most suitable formation. What else is to be done the circumstances of the various cases must decide; the indispensable condition is that the cavalry should never be present and inactive throughout the course of the battle. It must in all cases prevent the enemy's patrols from making observations as to the disposition of our own army, while, on the other hand, its own reconnaissance should never cease. We should, however, be quite wrong to regard such action as sufficient; rather must our whole attention be devoted to participating in the decisive battle, if in any way possible. With this view the cavalry must be careful to ensure its own advance to that portion of the ground where the decisive battle will probably take place, so that the charge will not meet with unexpected resistance and obstacles when the moment comes to ride it home. When this crisis of the battle approaches, the cavalry must be ready to intervene, whether it be to complete the defeat of the enemy and to facilitate the victory of its own infantry, or to support the latter in difficult situations. Deployment in masses and depth, if possible in several lines, is indispensable for such attacks. The outer flank must be secured by reserves against the action of freshly arriving hostile cavalry and the covering troops of the enemy's artillery. Only when reconnaissance has clearly shown that there are no more such hostile troops at hand can the reserves be dispensed with. The attack will best take place from the flank, and will then generally find a double objective in the hostile artillery and any infantry that may be farther to the front; but both should be dealt with _simultaneously_. There may also be a possibility and a necessity of attacking from the rear. Circumstances must decide this. In any case, there should be no question of a gradual engagement of a force, but the charge of the whole mass must, even when disposed in lines, be carried out in a simultaneous and preconcerted manner. The moment chosen for the attack is also of great importance. As the crisis approaches, endeavours must be made to get as close to the enemy as possible, in order to shorten the distance that will have to be covered in the charge. In so doing, the protection of the ground must be used as long as possible for cover, at least from view, without adhering to stereotyped tactical formations.