The factors of weakness, therefore, which allow but seldom of an effective pursuit have their origin in the nature of circumstances, and are exceedingly difficult to cope with. Energy and activity sufficient to this end are only to be found in moments of the greatest moral excitement, under the influence of overpowering personalities, or under special conditions, such, for example, as resulted after the battle of Waterloo. In the future, however, we shall generally have to reckon that these factors of weakness will prevail and the pursuit fail unless it is prepared with conscious intention in good time, and initiated with energy. Here will certainly be required careful leading, good tactical judgment, and rapid decision. Before all things, it is essential that any reserves still available should be sent forward in the directions important for pursuit as soon as it is judged that the battle is won, and that their supply should be arranged for before the pursuit begins. I may cite the battle of Woerth as an example. The 4th Cavalry Division stood at the disposal of the commander. Observation troops were sufficient in the direction of Hagenau and Zabern. This cavalry mass was, however, only brought up late in the evening, and arrived on the field too late to take up the immediate pursuit, although it had long been realised that a pursuit would become necessary. The infantry pursuit failed for different reasons. At the end of the day, when success inclined to the Germans, a fresh Württemberg brigade arrived upon the battlefield. Hot fighting still raged about Fröschweiler, in which the whole of the Vth and XIth Corps were involved. The Crown Prince, with a right appreciation of the situation, sent forward this brigade in a parallel pursuit against the right wing of the French in the direction of Reichshofen, where it could have denied the exit at Zabern to the French. This brigade, however, allowed itself to be deflected from its objective, and involved in the fighting round Fröschweiler, the capture of which was no longer of any real importance from the point of view of the Head Quarters. If the affair is practically decided, as was the case at Woerth, the reserves still in hand should no longer allow themselves to be drawn towards the various foci of the battle, but must be sent forward by the Commander-in-Chief with boldness and determination in the now more decisive directions of the pursuit. The same reasons and principles hold good for the pursuit by the cavalry. The cavalry commander must continually keep his finger on the pulse of the battle, and not watch only that portion of the great drama which is being played under his own eyes.