In close connection with this modified transition formation, the "change to lines" has also been retained in fact, though no longer designated as such. That is to say, the possibility of a change of front "to the complete flank," _i.e._ at right angles to the direction of march, is still contemplated (220),[48] and to this end a fresh formation of the division will generally be required, as well as a fresh directing brigade, which takes up the new line of march, and to which the remainder conform in the desired manner. It is apparently a matter of indifference whether the brigades are called lines or brigades. It is, and remains, a purely drill evolution of the division in close formation, a complete change of front to a flank, and is therefore something that would certainly not occur in war if any reasonable sort of information were to hand. If it did occur, it would presuppose the entire failure of reconnaissance and the corresponding incapacity of the leader. My cavalry instinct forbids me to share the tactical principles that these views entail, and I will therefore again endeavour to make clear that conception of the matter which I hold to be correct. First, as regards the demands of the Regulations that échelon is to replace depth. In my opinion, the conditions of reality have not in this matter been taken into account. To be able to meet a hostile squadron that has broken through the line, the écheloned squadron, if still in column, must wheel into line, or if, as is probable, already in line, must wheel, and then charge behind the front of its own attacking-line. I consider this, of itself, to be impracticable in the excitement of the fight, a manoeuvre that can only be carried out on the drill-ground. We have only to consult any one who has had experience of a cavalry attack to learn how difficult it is to perform such evolutions immediately before the charge. Then, again, what is our conception of such a hostile squadron breaking through? It may be expected to be accompanied by a simultaneous rearward movement of a corresponding portion of our own line, so that no clear objective for attack from the flank would be likely to offer itself. Such retirements of single portions of the line can only be met and counteracted by throwing in fresh forces from the rear; such has always been the experience in cavalry fights, as far as the teachings of history show. But there are other matters for consideration. How can the squadron, écheloned, for instance, on the _outer_ flank of a brigade, intervene when this so-called rupture of the line takes place on the _inner_ flank? In the dust and excitement of a cavalry fight, will such a rupture, especially in undulating country, be even noticed? What if there is a simultaneous threatening of the other flank, which the échelon is obliged to meet? What if the échelon has advanced in an enveloping movement? Who is then to deal with the rupture of the line?