Senior officers also are often to blame for the frequency of reports. Appointed to a command at manoeuvres, they want to know every detail about the enemy, and the exact minute in which an advance or a movement is made. Every little detachment must be reported, and the slightest movement watched. The result is that they encourage patrols, not only to send as many detailed reports as possible, but, if necessary, to obtain the information in a manner incompatible with service conditions. This is a deep-seated evil that is to be seen at all manoeuvres, and one that commanders should consistently endeavour to eradicate. Such procedure reacts upon the commanding officers themselves by exercising a harmful influence on their individual training. If everything is known about the strength, the line of advance, and the distance of the enemy, generalship descends to the level of the solution of an arithmetical problem, decisions of the commanding officers being based on complete and established data. What a difference is there in actual warfare! But meagre information is available regarding the enemy, and decisions must, as a rule, be based on a certain knowledge of one's own plans and a rough idea of the numbers, intentions, and fighting strength of the enemy. In the former case, decisions of commanding officers are the result of calculation; in the latter--_i.e._ in actual warfare--they are a matter for military skill, or the intuition of genius, which is a very different thing. These are the decisions that officers should be encouraged and trained to make; but, unless the malpractices that have crept into the reconnaissance work are rooted out, this valuable training for actual warfare is likely to be lost. But all that is only by the way. We are now discussing the cavalry and not the generals, and I should like to point out the great importance of training units themselves to report in a manner suited to service conditions, _i.e._ to report only important matters, and these _at the right time_, so that the commanding officer may receive information regarding the enemy in time to make the necessary dispositions, while at the same time the reconnoitring detachments need not unduly weaken themselves by the too frequent despatch of messages. On the field of battle reports could be carried by individual horsemen instead of by patrols, but of these only a limited number should be drawn from the squadron, as it is not possible to rely on their return. _They must_ also be taught only to take reports to such places as they could actually reach in war. At manoeuvres and other exercises they are often to be seen riding about behind the firing-line in the most exposed places, having apparently no idea of the dangers which they would run in real warfare. This habit, acquired in peace, may in time of war entail the loss of many riders, horses, and reports.