Up to now our Regulations have followed the teachings of military history in so far as they provided for supporting squadrons behind the front line in the attack against cavalry. The new Regulations, however, not only retain the "stirrup feeling,"[18] even in the attack against cavalry, but have also greatly limited the employment of supporting squadrons, and rendered it exceptional. The Regulations practically ignore the use of the second line in the attack against cavalry. To preserve cohesion in the attack in spite of this, the men in the rear rank are to advance into the front rank in order to fill the larger gaps which may there occur (106).[19] This will lead under certain circumstances to a loose, almost single-line attack against cavalry. These measures give ground for some concern. They can scarcely lead to any other end than to render steady riding to the charge impossible, to create disorder, and to deprive the already thin line of its force of impact. It appears to me to be very questionable whether such directions could be carried out at all in practice. They will most certainly not attain the object which the Regulations apparently expect, that is to say, of securing cohesion in the attack, and thereby a victory for one thin attacking line. The necessity for a second line under such circumstances appears all the more obvious. The Regulations in this respect direct (200)[20] that, "if the situation demands it, even single squadrons can follow in column formation," also as an exception. This indicates a distinct divergence from the proven results of all experience, and cannot, in my opinion, be even theoretically justified. Such dispositions cannot therefore be regarded as _justifiable_. _I consider it to be my unavoidable duty to express myself clearly upon this point._ They in no wise alter the fact that to attack the enemy successfully our cavalry must, where its comparative strength in any way allows, be fundamentally formed in two lines, and be launched to the charge in the closest attack formation, knee to knee. For it was thus that the Prussian squadrons gained their laurels in all the splendid victories of the Frederician and Napoleonic wars. At Mars la Tour, also, the success of the cavalry fight was decided by the 16th Dragoons, who threw themselves into the mêlée from the rear, acting as a second line entirely in accordance with the Frederician spirit. The 10th Hussars also attacked as a second line; and it was the cohesion of the 13th Dragoons, as we have already seen, that allowed them on two occasions rapidly to secure a victory. If the conditions of the fight of cavalry against cavalry to-day have remained practically unaltered as compared to those of the past, it is a very different matter where the attack is against troops armed with modern firearms, essentially infantry and artillery.