I have asked myself the question as to whether the fact that more men are to be left with the horses than formerly will perhaps make it possible to defend the led horses by dismounted patrols. The directions contained in the Regulations (368)[26] that hostile patrols must be kept at a distance by single sentries posted by the commander of the led horses indicates that such was perhaps the intention. But it appears to me that even _this_ object cannot be obtained in such a way. The sentries, if they are to defend the led horses from long-range fire in open country, must be pushed forward in considerable numbers, and very far, almost at rifle range. With single sentries close at hand, no proper protection is afforded, nor can posts be sent out 1,000 yards without giving them a strength which the force cannot afford. If, however, the protection of the led horses in difficult country is to be provided for, a few sentries will most assuredly not suffice to prevent hostile patrols approaching unobserved. In order to properly protect the led horses they must either be so disposed that they are actually covered from the view and fire of the enemy, or else secured by an escort strong enough to prevent hostile action against them. There is no third course. Taking these things into consideration I cannot regard the limitation of the number of rifles in the firing-line imposed by the Regulations as justifiable. It seems to me that here a sacrifice is made with no corresponding advantage resulting. This anxiety seems also to have influenced, to a certain degree, the text of the Regulations. In paragraph 367[27] the attempt is made to compensate in some measure for the danger created by the weakening of the firing-line. That is to say, the squadron leader is allowed in either method of dismounting (with half or three-quarters of the men) to reinforce the firing-line, if the situation demands, by diminishing the number of horse-holders. But it seems to me that this arrangement is not quite practicable, and does not sufficiently take into account the difficulties that will continually result therefrom in the conduct of a real fight. First of all, it must be regarded as extremely hazardous to leave such measures altogether in the hands of squadron leaders. Only consider, for example, the case of a brigade commander who dismounts half his men in order to keep his led horses mobile, and during the attack makes the discovery that the horses cannot follow because the squadron leaders have reinforced the firing-line from the horse-holders! Throughout the Regulations there are no sort of directions for limiting the initiative of the squadron leader in such matters in the case of the larger bodies of troops.