Here it is not only a case of consolidating the cohesion of the troops by the agency of the discipline of the drill ground, or of teaching the forms of movement and of fighting, although, of course, these points of view cannot be entirely disregarded; but the essential is to teach the methods of employment of the forms laid down in the Regulations for the combat. A regiment which can work through the Drill Book smoothly and with precision is still far from being trained for battle, but at the most has merely laid the foundations on which such a training can be subsequently built up. The same applies to a Brigade or Division, each of which has practised and made certain of the execution of such movements as passages of defiles, deployments, attacks, changes of front or of lines, and so forth. All these things are in themselves necessary and useful, but they make no great demands on the skill of the Leaders, only requiring an accurate knowledge of the book, and a certain degree of routine in the application of its prescriptions; but War makes quite different demands on their ability, and it is for War that we have to be prepared. First of all, in the purely formal side of the training, stress must especially be laid on those forms of movement which can actually be applied on the battle-field. Then, the troops must be exercised to apply these forms not only on the drill ground, but over every kind of country. Further, the tactical judgment and independence of the Leaders of all ranks must, be thoroughly developed. They must not only learn to act on fundamentally sound principles, but to apply these principles everywhere where circumstances require rapid decision, utilizing at once the tactical advantages the ground may offer, and adapting practically the few forms which can be employed before the enemy in the field instinctively; and, finally, opportunities must be granted to the Commanders to practise the combination of locally separated bodies to a single tactical purpose. In face of these requirements, it seems to me that our tactical training remains far too elementary in character, and does not tend with sufficient directness towards what is alone possible in War. The blame for this state of affairs rests by no means only on the shoulders of the troops, but is due to a variety of complex causes which are difficult to disentangle. In the first place comes the passive resistance, that moment of inertia which custom and tradition everywhere oppose to changes, and it is not to be expected that the troops of their own initiative will be able to abandon the accustomed ruts, when more especially the methods applied in our inspections are not always of a nature to encourage such attempts.