12. Out of every victorious melee one must endeavour, as soon as possible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediate pursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed (Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with the utmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power--if possible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employed must be adequate for the attainment of this end. CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY. 1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from different directions, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units are always to be employed by 'Wings.' 2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, he should be attacked from the flank. 3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though even against Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the less shaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines' (Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by the leading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire. 4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on the rapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances. 5. Only _closed_ 'Lines' on a broad front can be relied on for success. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object of attack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign each individual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, for the attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objects in the defender's lines will hardly be recognisable. Once within the zone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to undertake those changes of direction which one sees unhappily so constantly in peace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire line, and penetrates through as far as one can. 6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanks for security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy's Cavalry. 7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well up on the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, in order to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities. 8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possible outside the principal fire zone of the enemy. 9. The distance between following lines varies according to the nature of the enemy's fire. To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constant care from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. At the same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply them independently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelled to act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander (Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinate must be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section 317).