1. Attack of an occupied position.--Fire opens according to ground at 1,100 to 1,200 yards; gradual advances by rushes to decisive distances, which, with modern weapons and in open country, may be put at 700 to 900 yards. Development of the principal fire effort at this range, and beating down of the enemy's return fire. After attainment of the fire superiority, rapid advance by rushes, and in larger bodies. These rushes must be covered by the fire of those still lying down, until the point for the commencement of their assault is reached. Meanwhile, advance of the last Reserves, also by rushes, to the last fire position to give the final impulse for assault; assault; pursuit by fire. The strongest development possible of concentric fire consistent with the retention of adequate reserves to carry forward the fighting line. 2. Defence of a position.--(_a_) Obstinate defence; object not to let the assailant come too close; hence from 1,100 yards a considerable development of fire power; continuation of the fight at decisive range, and, according to the result, either pursuit by fire or rapid evacuation of the position with ultimate sacrifice of the rearguard to be formed by the last reserve. (_b_) Defence without the intention of standing fast, either to gain time or compel the enemy to deploy. Hence, principal fire effort between 1,000 and 1,300 yards, and then gradual break-off of the fight before the enemy can approach too close. N.B. In practice a favourable position is essential. 3. Surprise fire against marching columns or reserves whilst reconnoitring the enemy's approach, or whilst working round his flank and rear in the battle, or in pursuit without the intention of charging or defending one's self, mainly with the purpose of securing a momentary but considerable moral and material effect, then disappearing and renewing the attempt from another place, hence sudden 'Mass' fire from 1,500 to not less than 1,000 yards. At the same time, it must be explained that with our present carbine even a nominal effect can hardly be secured at the greater distances. Here I have anticipated the issue of a better weapon, an unconditional necessity for the Cavalry in any case. All these practices, however, will only then be of value when the officers possess a far more thorough knowledge of musketry and the capabilities of their weapon than is at present the case with us. It must therefore be insisted upon that, first our Regimental Commanders, and then the junior officers, should be ordered to attend the Infantry School of Musketry, in order that they may thoroughly master this new branch of knowledge. It will be asserted that the time for such thorough training in musketry cannot be found except at the cost of neglecting still more important branches of our service. But from my practical experience I cannot assent to this view. There is ample time, if it is not wasted on unpractical affairs.