The chief role of the Artillery must always remain the support of dismounted action of Cavalry in attack and defence; in the battle, protected by their own horsemen, to strike against the enemy's flank and rear, shell his columns on the march, to drive him out of weakly-defended places or defiles, and in all similar circumstances, such as war always develops afresh, to inflict upon him the utmost possible damage. In all these cases the batteries can choose their own positions and the nature of their fire with absolute freedom, according to the fundamental principles of their own Arm; they have time to pick up their own range, and to insure results by the duration of their action. CHAPTER VII STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY The attempt has often been made to advance formal principles and rules for the strategical, as well as tactical employment of the Arm, which will give a more or less safe foundation on which to base the grouping and employment of the available forces. Some regard a Cavalry Division as normally deployed when two brigades march on separate roads in first line, with the third following behind the centre in Reserve. Others want to see all brigades on one front, side by side; whilst yet others wish to see two brigades on one road, whilst the third pursues the same objective on a country lane. Even our Cavalry Regulations--which on this subject actually ventures to trespass on strategical ground--lays down (see Section 318) that 'in Reconnaissance the mass of the Division must be kept together until the enemy's Cavalry has been beaten out of the field.' I hold all these attempts which only hamper the free strategic employment of the Arm as not only mistaken, but contrary to the very essence of our being, and for the same reason I hold them even to be detrimental, because they are calculated to produce thoroughly false views as to the conditions and demands with which in practical warfare we are confronted. All these regulations fall to the ground the moment they have to be applied to strategical units of variable dimensions. Further, as I have developed above, the tasks which may fall to us are of such different natures that they cannot possibly be all solved by the same formulae. The strength of the enemy must naturally exercise decisive importance on the whole character of our action and the distribution of our forces. The lie of the roads and the nature of the country also exercise their influence on our decision.