Thus it is evident that it is not possible to lay down fixed rules of conduct either for operations or for the outposts, but all must be left to the capacity of the Leader and the adaptability of his men. On this capacity depends in the last resort the greater or less strategic value of the Arm. Its foundation can only be laid in peace, and will depend on thorough and successful training, together with suitable preparation of the whole organization for War. To both points I will recur in the second part of this work. Here I would only insist that naturally the collective strategic employment of the Arm must take a thoroughly different form in proportion as the troops are rendered more or less independent by their equipment, the leaders of all ranks are qualified to act on their own responsibility, and mobility is not hampered by difficulties in the provisioning of man and horse, and in the supply of ammunition. In the one case the Leader can act with courage and daring in the true Cavalry spirit; in the other he will feel himself hampered at every step, will not be able to act with the necessary degree of self-confidence, and will have to renounce the most promising undertakings because the inefficiency of his troops leaves him no alternative. However great his genius, no Leader can compensate for want of efficiency in his command; but it is the duty of such leader to maintain and increase the endurance inherent in his material to the utmost limits of its capacity. In this connection a well-thought-out system of saving and caring for one's horses occupies the first position, for this is the bed-rock foundation of all subsequent developments. We have seen of what immense importance in this respect the sheltering and arrangements for the outposts may be. But there are other factors to be considered--above all, a rational arrangement of the marches. In the first instance, it is a mistake to believe that Cavalry in the long-run can out-stay and out-march the Infantry--that, in other words, the Cavalry horse can endure greater hardships than well-trained Infantry. For a few days that may well be so, but for continuous exertion it is by no means proved. The German Cavalry horse is much more dependent on a sufficiency of food than the man; the nature of his load, together with the rapidity of movement, and hence the greater intensity of the exertions demanded of him, attack the animal in a far greater degree than the more uniform march performance of the men, who, moreover, are susceptible to moral influences, capable of greatly increasing their powers; finally, sore backs and lameness in long-continued exertions decimate the ranks of the horses to a much greater degree than a well-trained and equipped Infantry suffers from similar causes.