Thus one finds Generals who use their messengers as patrols even when special patrols have been entrusted with this duty; others who keep the detachments assigned to the outposts long after the outposts themselves have been relieved. In all these things there is a tremendous waste of energy, which must be all the more injurious the smaller the proportion of Cavalry which can be detailed to the Infantry Divisions. It is a special duty of every Cavalry Commander to resist this tendency to the utmost of his power. Apart from the regulation of the marching column and the economy of forces above referred to, a rational treatment of the rearward communications, particularly with the Independent Cavalry, will go far to maintain the troops in efficiency, and is also from the strategic point of view an important part of the Leader's duty. The daily despatch of numerous requisitioning detachments to great distances weakens and diminishes the troops to an inadmissible degree, unless it is managed with a wise foresight and on a rational system; often on great marches it will be altogether impossible. Then the horses must manage with what they find at their halting-places for the night. In the case of great concentration this will be altogether insufficient. Short rations reduce the horses very rapidly and only too thoroughly. It is, therefore, necessary in all independent operations of great Cavalry 'Masses' to take with one an organized and mobile supply train, and, where circumstances require, to arrange for its defence. The timely arrival of the supply waggons, the rational utilization of the resources of the district, the contiguous replenishment of the moving supply reserves, are matters which cannot be left entirely to the Army Service Corps, but the Cavalry General must himself overlook the whole matter, and keep the general control in his own hands. For these arrangements must be regulated from the strategic point of view since the power of operating at all depends essentially upon them. Of course, the Supreme Command must lend assistance also. In general, it will be advisable to carry with one a five to six days' ration of corn if one is to be prepared for all emergencies. That, at least, was the practical teaching of the War of 1870-1871. But one must add, the further the Cavalry is separated from the masses of the Army, and the more it renounces its communications with the latter, the greater must be the bulk of supply it takes with it; and the closer these supplies have to be kept to the troops, the more thorough must be the arrangements for their protection. The latter will be of particular importance when operating on a narrow front which favours an enemy's outflanking endeavours, whereas wider fronts of themselves give a certain degree of security to the rearward communications.