Chapters on the History of the Southern PacificDaggett, Stuart
History
Chapters on the History of the Southern Pacific
Daggett, Stuart
Pacific railroads -- History; Railroads -- California -- History; Southern Pacific Company
Unscrupulousness of Associates
One rises from the study of the political activities of the owners of
the Central Pacific with a feeling of indignation at the selfishness
of these men, their indifference to all save considerations of private
gain, and their readiness to use any and all methods which would
advance their financial interests. The associates met the proposal of
government regulation as a threat to rob them of their property and
resisted it as they would have opposed any other attack. They never
conceded that any question of public interest was involved which it was
necessary for them to respect. They frankly defended the use of money
as a method of persuading men to do what was right—which inevitably
meant, of course, what in their judgment was right. They fell out among
themselves, not because any one of them questioned the philosophy which
inspired their opposition to public control, but because one of them
was suspected of using power, developed in the course of the defense of
railroad interests, to advance personal ambitions which ran counter to
the views of his associates. These things should be plainly stated and
their force clearly understood.
It is the writer’s opinion, however, that the amount of money spent
by the Central Pacific in the purchase of legislative or other votes
has probably been overestimated in the public mind. Direct bribery
is a clumsy weapon and one difficult to conceal if practiced on any
considerable scale. It was probably also unnecessary to a corporation
such as the Central Pacific with other favors to bestow. Members of
Congress might, indeed, be employed by the railroad when legislation
was pending. Huntington maintained that this was legitimate,[337] and
Gage once admitted that the company had to employ everybody who could
pull a pound. The practice was more easily defensible than bribery, and
could be applied to a better class of men. Other men might be reached
through patronage, still others through discrimination in rates or
through preferences. The suggestion that unfavorable legislation would
hinder construction was potent with legislators from districts which
still lacked rail connection. Yet Huntington once said of a man who
was opposing him and whom he thought he could bribe, that his better
judgment told him the associates could not afford to take the scamp
into camp,[338] and this probably represented the situation at most
times. Whether this worked for the eventual salvation of the Huntington
group, is for the moralist to say.
CHAPTER XIII
WATER COMPETITION
Rate Policy
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