In the year 1897 the pending maturity of the United States subsidy bonds made the situation too critical for action to be much further delayed. On March 4, 1897, the 54th Congress and the second administration of President Cleveland came to an end, and the administration of President McKinley began. A special session of Congress, called by the new President, convened on March 15. During this session Mr. Gear introduced a bill for the appointment of a commission to settle the debt of the Central Pacific and Western Pacific railroads to the government.[578] This bill failed to pass. In December, 1897, the first regular session of the 55th Congress convened. By this time the maturity of a large portion of the subsidy bonds was distant only a few weeks. That is to say, the bonds issued to the Central and Western Pacific railroads matured as follows: January 16, 1895 $ 2,362,000 ” 1, 1896 1,600,000 ” 1, 1897 2,432,000 ” 1, 1898 10,614,120 ” 1, 1899 10,847,560 About $2,000,000 of these bonds were held in the sinking fund established by the Thurman Act. These had naturally been canceled as they fell due. On December 21, 1896, moreover, most of the remaining bonds held by the government in the Central Pacific sinking fund had been sold and the proceeds applied to maturing indebtedness.[579] These resources, together with the credits in the Central Pacific bond and interest account, had covered the demands upon the company up to January 1, 1898. Meanwhile coupons on the first mortgage bonds had been regularly paid, and arrangements had been made with first mortgage bondholders to extend the maturity of each instalment until January 1, 1898, at which date first mortgage bonds of the Central Pacific Railroad Company to the amount of $25,883,000 were to mature. First mortgage bonds of the Western Pacific Railroad, aggregating $1,970,000, matured on July 1, 1899. It was evident that all available Central Pacific resources would be exhausted by the 1st of January, 1898. Negotiations Initiated In the face of what amounted to a real crisis, involving not only the possibility of loss to the government, but also that of serious financial injury to private interests connected with the Pacific railroads, the initiative in seeking a compromise was now taken by the banking firm of James Speyer and Company, of New York, through which a large amount of Central Pacific securities had been marketed. Mr. Speyer felt responsibility in the matter because so many of his clients were involved. He later testified: